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ABSTRACT

THE RETRIEVAL OF ATT I TUD I NALLY- RELEVANT INFORMATION FROM
MEMORY:

EFFECTS ON SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PERSUASION
AND ON INTRINSIC MOTIVATION

September 1980

Wendy Wood, B.S., University of Illinois-Champaign
M.S., Psychology, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Alice H. Eagly

A comparison between attitude research conducted within the

framework of attribution theory and more classic attitude research
revealed two different perspectives on the nature of attitudes.

Attribution approaches assume that attitude judgments are derived
in large part from contextual cues whereas more traditional

approaches postulate an underlying predisposition toward the
attitude object.

It was proposed that these perspectives identify

two means of formulating attitude judgments.

Attitudes can be

derived primarily from contextual cues and recent behavior or

primarily from the retrieval of attitudinally-relevant information
from memory.

It was hypothesized that new information that

counters initial opinions toward the attitude object would have
a

greater impact on context-derived than memory-derived attitudes

because context-derived attitudes are drawn relatively more from

currently available data and less from prior experience and beliefs.

iii

The distinction between memory- and context-derived
judgments
was operationalized in terms of subjects* retrieval of
attitudinally-

relevant information from memory.

Subjects were given two minutes to

list their beliefs about the topic, preservation of the
environment,
and two minutes to list their previous experiences with the
topic.

Checks revealed that these retrieval tasks appropriately represented
the memory- versus context-derived distinction:
few,

Subjects who listed

rather than many, behaviors perceived themselves to have

experienced more thought, action, and feelings about preservation
of the environment and to be more knowledgeable and informed.

Results for beliefs were similar, though nonsignificant.
The impact of new information on attitudes was explored

through

a

persuasion study and an intrinsic motivation study.

In

the persuasion research, subjects' opinions were assessed before

and after exposure to

a

counterattitudinal message arguing against

preservation of the environment.

Consistent with

a

cognitive

response analysis of persuasion, subjects who retrieved few,

rather than many, behaviors produced more counterarguments and
fewer thoughts favorable to the message.

These thoughts mediated

opinion change such that subjects who retrieved few, rather than
many, behaviors and few, rather than many, beliefs showed less

opinion change.
In the intrinsic motivation study, subjects' opinions were

assessed before and after they decided to deliver

message on preservation of the environment.

iv

a

proattitudinal

Subjects either

received

a

$5

reward for their decision or no reward.

Consistent

with previous intrinsic motivation research, rewarded
subjects
changed their opinions more than not rewarded subjects.

Further,

the analysis yielded differences due to the number of
behaviors

subjects listed.

Subjects who retrieved few behaviors inferred

attitudes consistent with whether or not they were rewarded for
the
decision:

Rewarded subjects, compared with those not rewarded,

attributed their decision less to belief in preservation and
subsequently became less favorable toward preservation.

In contrast,

in the many behaviors groups, rewarded subjects unexpectedly made
a

stronger attribution to their belief than not rewarded subjects.

Yet, as predicted, the opinions of subjects who retrieved many

behaviors remained relatively favorable toward preservation.
These findings support the self-perception analysis

(Bern,

1972)

that when internal cues, such as prior experiences relevant to
the attitude object, are not accessible, attitudes are inferred

from behavior and the context in which it occurs.

The distinction between memory- and context-derived attitudes
was discussed in terras of recent theories of how the presence or

absence of

a

information.

self-schema affects processing of schema-related
It was argued that the retrieval measures employed in

the present research are superior to the measures commonly used in
the work of self-schemata (e.g., involvement, extremity of

opinions) because extent of retrieval more directly reflects the

degree to which people have access to relevant information in
memory.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Social psychological research on attitudes stems from
at least
two very different traditions.

construct in

a

One of these employs the attitude

manner analogous to traits, emphasizing the enduring

dispositions that underlie an attitude judgment.

For example,

McGuire (1969), employing Allport's (1935) definition, proposed
that an attitude is "a mental and neural state of readiness to
respond, organized through experience, exerting

dynamic influence on behavior" (McGuire, 1969,

a

p.

directive and/or
142).

Many

classic theories of attitudes, such as learning theories (e.g.,
Staats,
1957),

1968) and cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Festinger,

implicitly accepted this view.

In contrast,

the second

tradition of research emphasizes the temporary nature of attitudes.

According to this view, attitude expressions are often determined
by the information available in the situation in which they are
expressed.
(Kelley,

This approach has been adopted by attribution theory

1967,

1972) and self-perception theory

(Bern,

1972), which

frequently focus on an individual's construction of his or her
attitude from the situational cues available immediately prior to
assessment.
It is not surprising that attitudes have been conceptualized

in several different ways.

Given the complexity and versatility of

.
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human cognitive processes that have been noted
in other areas
(e.g., Neisser,

1976), it is to be expected that the attitude

literature would reveal that people can formulate
attitudes in

different ways, ranging from judgments which reflect stable
ori<
.entations to more superficial judgments derived from currently
available information.

Others have argued that Bern's (1972) self-perception theory

conceptualizes attitudes in
al theories.

a

different manner from more tradition-

For example, Greenwald (1968) distinguished between

the approaches in terms of the internal or external nature of the

information on which the attitude is based.

According to

Greenwald, self-perception theory assumes that an individual's

attitude can be derived from situational cues that can also be

employed by an observer to infer the individual's attitude, and it
assumes that changes in these external cues can lead to attitude
change.

In contrast, attitude theories commonly assume that an

individual's attitude provides internal stimuli available only to
him or her, and they have commonly linked attitude change to

a

corresponding change in the information internally available to the
individual
The present view integrates these two conceptualizations of

attitude into

a

general framework that views attitude judgments in

terms of the information on which the judgment is based.

The tra-

ditional conceptualization of attitudes assumes that people learn

particular orientation toward the attitude object.

Learned

a

3

orientations can be based on affective reactions
toward the object,
beliefs about it, and previously expressed positions
in reference
to it.

It is important to note that the idea of a
learned predis-

position implies that attitude judgments are based in large
part on
information retrieved from memory.

For this reason, such judgments

will be called memory-derived attitudes.

In contrast, attribution

theory (Kelley, 1967, 1972) and self-perception theory
employ the term attitude to describe

a

(Bern,

1972)

judgment based on inform-

ation derived from contemporaneous situational factors and one's
recent behavior in relation to the attitude object.

According to

this perspective, people formulate an attitude judgment by focusing

primarily on these contemporaneous cues, and they retrieve little
cognitive support for the judgment.

This type of judgment will be

called a context-derived attitude because it emphasizes the inform-

ation that is currently available in the situation.

It is possible

to explore the characteristics of memory- and context-derived

judgments by contrasting research that considers an attitude judgment to be

a

reflection of

a

predisposition to respond with

research that focuses on the way contemporaneous cues are in-

corporated into an attitude inference.

Memory-derived attitudes

will be examined through some of the classic attitude theories and

through recent work on the cognitive schemata that may underlie
self-perceptions.

Context-derived attitude judgments will be

explored in terms of attribution theory and self-perception theory.

4

Self-Attribution of Attitudes
Theories of self-attribution have generally focused
on how

perceivers infer their attitudes from
incident

(Bern,

1972; Kelley,

a

recent or salient behavioral

1972; Nisbett & Valins,

1972).

These

analyses assume that an attitude judgment is greatly influenced
by

contemporaneous cues such as recent behavior except in the infrequent case that the inference has been made repeatedly in the past.
It is recognized that then people may invoke these previous judgments.

Research on attitude attribution has generally been concerned
with attitude inference from behavior which

is

consistent or incon-

sistent with subjects' reports of their initial position on an
issue.

In order to simplify the present discussion, the analysis

will draw primarily from research on proattitudinal behavior,
rather than counterattitudinal
a

,

because the mechanisms underlying

proattitudinal inference may be relatively less complex.

Attitude

change following counterattitudinal behavior can be explained

through several underlying mechanisms:

It can be accounted for by

an increase in cognitive discomfort and subsequent dissonance reduc-

tion through attitude change (Higgins, Rhodwalt, & Zanna
Zanna & Cooper, 1974), or, like

a

,

1979;

proattitudinal action, it can be

explained through the self-perception process of inferring an

attitude directly from behavior

(Bern,

1972; Kleinke,

1978).

Even

though the processes underlying these two judgments may at times
differ, the conclusions drawn from the present analysis should be

5

applicable to attitude inferences from either pro- or
counter-

attitudinal behavior.
derived from

a

In both cases, the attitude judgment is

recent behavioral incident rather than

a

stable,

organized set of beliefs and affective reactions toward the
attitude object.
Further, our analysis will focus on intrinsic motivation in

preference to other types of proattitudinal research because
trinsic motivation research comprises

a

(a)

in-

very large majority of work

in the study of proattitudinal behavior and (b) subjects are

required simply to engage in
a

a

persuasive message supporting

behavior and not to develop or read
a

position.

When subjects are

asked to develop or review arguments in favor of

may be forced to engage in
analysis of the issue.

a

a

position they

thorough, though perhaps biased,

In the process, subjects may utilize in-

formation other than that currently available in the assessment
situation.

Research on intrinsic motivation, along with other self-

perception research, relies on the fact that behavior caused by nonattitudinal factors may be misperceived to be relevant to an
attitude judgment.

Kelley (1967) has noted that when subjects in

these experiments are asked to perform an activity, they consider
the behavior an indicator of their attitude because they under-

estimate the impact of experimental demand, which is the actual
cause of the behavior.

This misperception can lead perceivers to

infer an attitude that is consistent with attitudinally-irrelevant

behavior.

6

Intrinsic motivation research typically presents
one group of
subjects with

reward for performing

a

a

somewhat enjoyable task and

another group engages in the task without the reward.
is then removed,

and all subjects are asked to make

a

The reward

general

evaluative rating of the task, commonly operationalized as
interest
and enjoyment (Deci, 1971), or preference for the task over
others
(Ross,

1975).

Often subjects' behavioral performance on the task

before and after the reward is also observed.
are generally thought to engage in

a

Rewarded subjects

causal analysis to determine

whether their behavior is due to the reward or to

a

favorable

attitude toward the task, whereas nonrewarded subjects have only
their liking for the task as

a

plausible cause.

The comparison be-

tween the rewarded and nonrewarded groups typically indicates that
external rewards decrease favorability toward

a

task, presumably

because rewarded subjects attribute their behavior to the reward
and nonrewarded subjects attribute it to

a

favorable attitude.

Researchers of intrinsic motivation analyze the process by

which perceivers identify

a

cause for their behavior in terms of

the information currently available to perceivers.

focus on Kelley's (1967,
Bern's

These analyses

1972) discounting principle, which follows

(1972) self-perception theory when applied to inferences

According to

about one's own behavior.
their favorability toward

a

Bern,

subjects often infer

task from their behavior when external

causes for task performance are not available.

In the presence of

external rewards, subjects often attribute their performance to the
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reward and assume it is not internally caused.

Self-perception research

is

frequently conducted with setting s

and stimuli that are unfamiliar to subjects
(e.g., certain word-

games or mathematical puzzles).

Therefore, it is not surprising

that they use contemporaneous cues when initially
formulating an
attitude.

Indeed, Kelley (in Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1978) has

noted that self-perception research often involves "an
experimental
setting in which you're being asked about something you're experiencing for the first time, so you have no self -concept" in relation to the issue

(p.

379).

There is evidence, however, to suggest that people rely on

contemporaneous cues to infer their attitude even when they have
previous experience with the attitude object.

For example, Lepper,

Greene, and Nisbett (1973) either rewarded or did not reward chil-

dren for drawing pictures with magic markers.

The children were

then given an opportunity to draw pictures without the reward, and
the amount of time they spent on the task was interpreted as their

liking for the activity.

Since all children probably had

to draw pictures prior to participating in the experiment,

chance

a

they

could have invoked this previous experience when evaluating their
attitude.

According to Kelley'

s

(1972) covariance analysis, the

task behavior would be attributed to the cause with which it
covaries, that is, subjects' liking for the activity.

children who received

a

Yet those

reward, compared with those who did not,

spent less time on the activity after the reward was removed.

This

8

finding would not have been obtained if subjects
had conducted

covariance-type analysis.

a

It appears that subjects instead
focused

primarily on the current situation, and rewarded
subjects considered the reward a plausible cause of their behavior.

analysis can be applied to studies utilizing

a

A similar

within-subjects

design, in which participants were first asked to
perform

then were given

a

a

task,

reward for performing it, and finally were asked

to perform it again without the reward (e.g., Green,
Sternberg, &

Lepper, 1976).

Subjects in these experiments could utilize the

experiences of performing the task with and without

formulating their attitude.

Yet subjects showed

a

a

reward in

decrement in

task performance when the reward was removed, presumably because

they utilized their most recent experience of performing the task
for a reward, and considered the reward

performance.

a

plausible cause for

Research on self-perception theory therefore suggests

that when evaluating their attitude, people may focus on the inform-

ation currently available in the situation to the exclusion of
other data.
In order to understand how people can infer an attitude from

an assessment of contemporaneous cues such as

a

recent behavior, it

is helpful to consider the self-perception process in detail.

Bern

(1972) suggests that we observe our behavior and infer that an

action without obvious external cause must correspond to an internal attitude.

But this view of self-perception does not specify

the information on which an attitude judgment is based or the
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process by which this information is identified.

The present

analysis will attempt to address these two
issues.

It will be

argued that the self-attribution process can
be understood in
terms of three steps:
for their behavior,

perceivers identify the plausible causes

(1)

they attribute the behavior to

(2)

a

particular

cause(s), and (3) they infer an attitude on the basis
of the

identified cause(s).
sequential processes.

These steps may not always occur as independent

For example, if only one cause is identified,

the first and second steps would be conducted simultaneously.

Identification of causes
causality is

a

Inherent in our culture's definition of

.

general perspective concerning the variety of causal

factors that can produce particular effects.

These

a

priori causal

theories can lead us to favor certain types of explanations for
events (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

very robust:

These theories also appear to be

Intuitive notions about the probable causes for an

event may be employed to the exclusion of causes which have

a

more

reliable statistical relationship to the event (Ajzen, 1977).
Causal salience may also affect which causal factors are

likely to be identified.

Taylor and Fiske (1978) and Pryor and

Kriss (1977) argue that in their attributional processing, per-

ceivers may often employ the most salient causal factor to the ex-

clusion of other plausible causes.
The interpretation of one's own behavior does appear to be

affected by causal salience:
search appear to identify

a

Subjects in intrinsic motivation rereward as the cause for their task
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performance only when the reward

is

salient (Ross, 1975).

When the

reward is present but not salient, subjects
appear to explain their

behavior primarily in terms of
task.

a

favorable attitude toward the

Other evidence of the impact of salience is
provided by

research on proattitudinal advocacy (Kiesler, Nisbett,
& Zanna,
1969;

Zanna & Kiesler, 1971).

Kiesler, Nisbett, and Zanna (1969)

asked subjects to proselytize an attitude-consistent
position on
the topic of air pollution.

Those who heard another participant

remark that his or her participation reflected

a

issue (i.e., enhancing the salience of belief as

belief in the
a

cause) appeared

to infer that their behavior must also indicate a favorable

attitude, whereas subjects overhearing

reflected

a

salience of

a

remark that participation

desire to support good research (i.e., enhancing the
a

desire for social good) may have inferred that their

behavior was not relevant to their attitude, and indicated

a

less

favorable position on the issue.
The attitude inference process may not always be affected by

situational factors enhancing the salience of

a

particular cue(s).

It has been suggested that people's preconceived rules identifying

certain types of information as relevant or salient may also influence the causes that are identified (Salancik & Conway, 1975).

Salancik and Conway assessed subjects' attitudes toward

a

college

course after an experimental manipulation had enhanced the salience
of subjects' previous behaviors favorable or unfavorable toward the

course.

Course majors appeared to infer their attitude from
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whichever behaviors were salient.

Nonmajors' attitudes, however,

were not affected by the manipulation.

Apparently, they inferred

their attitude from their course grade.

For nonmajors, liking for

the course may not have been a salient or relevant
cause for their

course-related behavior.

Favorably-oriented behaviors, such as

working hard in the course, could be the result of an inspiring
instructor or their own good study habits, whereas liking depended
on the grade they received.

There may also be conditions under which people are not affected

by the salience of plausible causes.

Taylor (1975) provides evidence

to indicate that the salience of information relevant to subjects'

self-perceptions is quite important when involvement is low, but has
little effect with high involvement.

Under high involvement

conditions, subjects appear to conduct

a

comparatively systematic

analysis of relevant information that utilizes both salient and

nonsalient cues. -Taylor and Fiske (1978) have argued that these
findings do not minimize the importance of salience effects because
low involvement behavior may be characteristic of daily activities.

Plausibility and salience are certainly not the only mechanisms
affecting preferred causal factors.

We have argued that perceivers

may sometimes limit their search to contemporaneous causes, and not
conduct

a

detailed analysis drawing on past experience.

In addition,

the familiarity of a causal factor may, under some conditions, make
it a likely candidate for inclusion in a causal analysis.

Perceivers

may also have idosyncratic reasons for favoring one type of causal

12

explanation over another.
The number of causal factors that are commonly
identified in the

process of explaining an event has recently received
some consideration.

One view holds that plausibility and salience
serve to weight

particular causal factors more than others.

This analysis suggests

that more than one cause is initially identified, but
the one likely
to be chosen is the one most salient and/or plausible

(cf.

Anderson,

1971).

Another analysis suggests that salience and plausibility affect
which cause(s) is initially recognized.

According to this view,

only the most salient and/or plausible cause features in perceivers'
causal analyses.

This perspective has been associated with theoreti-

cal analyses of salience, which hold that perceivers often focus on

one salient cause to the exclusion of other causes (Pryor & Kriss,
1977; Taylor & Fiske,

1978).

Others have also noted that causal

analyses may be limited to consideration of one causal factor.

Fischoff (1976) interprets the social prediction literature to
indicate that people are generally not able to handle multivariate, conditional thinking.

Similarly, Kanouse (1972) argues

that subjects discontinue their search for explanation as soon as

a

sufficient cause has been identified, rather than continue the
analysis until the best explanation is achieved.

He suggests that

this phenomenon reflects a general bias to view unitary events as

having unitary causes.

In a study providing indirect support for

this analysis, subjects were asked to describe two personal failure
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or rejection experiences and to indicate why
the experience occurred

(Janoff-Bulman, Note 1).

For 59 percent of the incidents listed,

only one causal factor was identified.
were explained in terms of

a

The majority of incidents

single cause that sufficiently accounted

for the event.

The question of how many causes are commonly invoked during

perceivers' preattribution information search is difficult to
resolve.

Research methodologies which provide subjects with

a

list of plausible

causes cannot be used to assess whether subjects spontaneously infer

more than one cause.

Other approaches, such as having subjects list

possible causes for an event, do not provide unambiguous results.

For

example, subjects may only list one cause because of disinterest in
the task or inability to recall anything but the factor finally chosen
as the cause.

Attribution to identified cause(s)

.

At this stage in perceivers'

analysis, an explanation is formulated from the plausible causal
factor(s).

If more than one cause has been identified, Kelley's

(1972) discounting principle, augmentation principle, or another

causal schema may be applied to arrive at an explanation.

If only

one cause has been recognized, perceivers probably explain the

behavior in terms of this factor.

Attitude inference

.

The next stage in perceivers' analysis concerns

the inference of an attitude from the chosen cause(s).

Attribution

researchers often assume that attributing behavior to an internal

.
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cause (oneself) leads to the inference of
an attitude evaluatively

consistent with the behavior whereas attribution
to an external
cause (the environment) does not allow

a

clear attitude inference.

However, attitudes cannot clearly be labeled an
internal phenomenon

because they are generally assumed to represent
a

person (internal) and an object (external).

a

relation between

According to the

present analysis, an attitude inference can result from the
location
of cause in either the person or the attitude object, but
not in

aspects of the situation, such as time and modality, which can vary

independently of the attitude object (Kelley, 1967)

1

In order to distinguish the present causal taxonomy from others

less appropriate (e.g., internal vs. external), location of cause
in the person or the object will be labeled an intrinsic

attribution, and location in the situation will be termed an

extrinsic attribution.

Although little consensus exists concerning

the appropriate use of these terms in attribution theorizing, there
is some precedent for the present definition.

Researchers of intrinsic

motivation (e.g., Ross, 1976) implicitly consider an intrinsically
motivated activity to be in response to

a

feature of the attitude

object (i.e., the task) and an extrinsically-motivated activity to be
in response to an aspect of the situation which can vary independently
of the attitude object (i.e., the reward).

To understand the link between causal attributions and attitudes,
it is helpful to consider the attitudinal implications of identifying
a

particular cause for

a

behavior.

An interesting study by Salancik

15

(1976) suggests that different kinds of
attitudinally-relevant info rma-

tion are retrieved from memory depending on
whether one makes an

intrinsic or extrinsic attribution.

Salancik (1976) elicited subjects' reactions to
for which they had received a high grade.

a

college course

In the experimental con-

ditions that are most relevant to the present analysis,
subjects re-

called particular aspects of their experiences with the
course,

which included their course-related behavior.

Some subjects were

then encouraged to attribute their course behaviors to extrinsic

features of the course (e.g., the course grade, credit toward

graduation) whereas others were not encouraged to make this attribution.

Subjects'

attitudes toward the course were then assessed.

As would be expected, those subjects who did not attribute

their behavior extrinsically employed their behavior as an indicator
of their attitude toward the course.

But it appears that these

subjects did not infer their attitudes directly from their behavior.
Instead, subjects seem to have recalled

a

subset of the course char-

acteristics (e.g., lectures, subject matter) which was evaluatively

consistent with the behavior, and based their attitudes on these features.

Also as predicted, subjects who did make an extrinsic

attribution did not use their course-related behaviors to infer their
attitude.

Instead, they inferred attitudes consistent with their

behaviors toward factors extrinsic to the course
strumental in getting

a

— behaviors

good grade but not necessarily

of liking for the course itself.

a

in-

reflection

The recall and use of the
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extrinsically-oriented behaviors appeared to be
associated with lack
of recall for the characteristics of the
course.

Subjects who made

an extrinsic attribution, compared with those
who did not, were found
to have less favorable attitudes toward the
course, perhaps because

they were unable to recall course characteristics,
from whxch favorable

attitudes develop.
It appears that attributing behavior on a likeable
task to ex-

trinsic rewards may inhibit the recall of task characteristics,
and

may enhance the salience of experiences extrinsic to the task.

Because

positive task characteristics are not available to inform the judgment,
a

relatively unfavorable attitude results.

A similar analysis can

perhaps be applied to an attribution to intrinsic causes of task performance.

The characteristics of the likeable activity may be

selectively retrieved, and

a

favorable attitude results.

To summarize, attitude judgments can be based primarily on con-

temporaneous cues such as one's recent behavior.

Research on in-

trinsic motivation indicates that recent behavior can be used to
infer one's attitude toward an activity.
of several stages:
a

is

This analysis may consist

On the basis of causal salience or plausibility,

cause(s) is identified for the behavior.

When more than one cause

identified, perceivers employ attribution rules, such as the

causal schemata proposed by Kelley (1972), to arrive at an explanation.

If the cause reflects something about the person's orientation

toward the activity or something about the activity, then attribution
to the cause may lead to selective retrieval of characteristics of
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the activity.

When task characteristics are positive,

favorable attitude may be inferred.

relatively

a

Conversely, if the cause is

extrinsic to the activity, then attribution to
the cause leads to
retrieval of extrinsic rather than intrinsic
features.
task is attractive,

a

When the

relatively unfavorable attitude is inferred

because positive task characteristics are not available
to be in-

corporated into the attitude judgment.
The inference of an attitude from behavior is one means of
con-

structing an attitude judgment from contemporaneous cues.

The

initial expression of this attitude will not generally reflect

a

stable orientation toward the attitude object because it is not based
on a coherent set of beliefs and affective reactions.

Instead, the

inference is linked to the particular cues available in the situation
at the time when the inference is made.

Reliance on contemporaneous

cues can lead to predictable biases in judgment.

The review of in-

trinsic motivation research indicated that the inference may not take
into account the full impact of the situational determinants of

behavior and it can be based primarily on salient causal factors.

Memory-Derived Attitudes

The theoretical analyses and empirical findings in intrinsic

motivation and self-perception are in sharp contrast to the approach
taken by more traditional attitude theories.

According to the latter

view, an attitude judgment is not usually fundamentally determined by

contemporaneous cues that vary with each assessment.

Although people
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incorporate new information into their attitude
judgment, and the
opinions they express may be sensitive to situational
constraints,
the attitude judgment is still thought to primarily
be
of one's learned response to the attitude object.

a

function

For example,

cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Festinger, 1957) focus
on the

relationship between the existing cognitive structure underlying
one's

attitude toward an object and new experiences with the object that
may be consistent or inconsistent with these prior cognitions.

According to this view, changing one's attitude to be consistent with
new experiences is only one of several ways of achieving cognitive
consistency.

The major difference between the self-perception view

of attitudes and that taken by some traditional attitude theorists

appears to be the presence of an existing cognitive structure in

relation to an attitude object.

Self-perception research focuses on

attitude inferences which are based on information derived from

contemporaneous cues, whereas traditional views of attitude judgments
assume that cognitive structures in memory provide an orientation

toward the attitude object and that this orientation is reflected in
the attitude inference.

In order to understand this distinction,

it

is helpful to consider the nature and function of the cognitions

which can underlie an attitude judgment.

McGuire (1969) distinguished between two general formulations of
the informational components hypothesized to underlie attitudes.

According to the expectancy-value model, an attitude is
one's beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Rosenberg, 1956).

a

function of

Fishbein
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and Ajzen argue that only a limited set
of a person's total beliefs
are salient at any one time, and the
attitude indicated depends on

which beliefs are salient.

Further, salient beliefs are thought to

be arranged hierarchically in memory in terms
of the subjective

probability that the belief is correct.

The second formulation of

attitude structure assumes that attitudes are comprised
of three
components:

cognitive, affective, and conative.

The cognitive

component consists of beliefs about the object and perceptual
responses, the affective pertains to feelings of liking or dis-

liking about the object, and the conative refers to behavioral

tendencies toward the object.

It has been suggested that some

attitudes are composed primarily of one component, whereas others

contain strong elements of several components (Katz, 1960).
'

The two formulations of attitude structure represent divergent

viewpoints.

The expectancy-value model is concerned specifically

with the cognitive component of attitudes, and it is usually

validated through its correlation with affect.

Proponents of this

view have argued that cognitive, affective, and conative components
are not independent constructs but merely alternate ways of assessing

attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

Some supporters of

a

multi-

component view have recently argued that although behavioral tendencies may in part reflect the other two components, the cognitive and

affective components represent dif ferentiable aspects of attitudes
(Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979; Norman, 1975).

Despite these different

perspectives, it is generally agreed that cognition and affect, and
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perhaps behavior, can contribute to an
attitude judgment.

Although

the components may encompass redundant
information, an attitude can

b«

drawn from these different types of information.
In addition to considering the information
that can be incor-

porated into an attitude judgment, an examination
of the structure of

attitudinally-relevant information in memory

is helpful to under-

stand the cognitions that underlie an attitude.

Social psychologists

have not traditionally been concerned with the way
information is

stored in memory and how it is accessed during attitude
assessment.

However, recent work on social cognition illustrates that
cognitive
theories can increase our knowledge of social psychological
phenomenon.

Wyer and Carlston (1979) argue that network models of

semantic memory can provide some insight 'into the way sociallyrelevant information may be stored and accessed.

Network models of semantic memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus,
1975) suggest that concepts are organized hierarchically in memory,

and may be represented as nodes in

a

network.

The concepts that

are stored in semantic memory may take many f orms--ranging from

nouns to complex patterns of behavior, such as "what to do if you
see a red light."

Nodes which represent an individual's experience

can encompass descriptions of past experiences as well as thoughts.

Properties of the concepts are signified by labeled relational paths

between nodes.
connected by
is

a

For example,

a

concept and its superordinate may be

link with the label "is a."

The meaning of

a

concept

contained in the network of these relations, which link it to
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other concepts.

Excitation flows between two concepts when
they are

connected in thought, and the association
becomes stronger with the

frequency and the recency excitation has been
transmitted along the
linking paths.

property of

a

Therefore, how often

a

person thinks about or uses

a

concept can affect how easily that feature
is

retrieved.

Concepts and experiences can be stored in memory at
varying
levels of abstraction.

Abelson's (1976) script theory suggests

that initial exposure to an event tends to be stored at

relatively

a

concrete level, but with increasing knowledge about the incident,
storage and processing tend to occur at more abstract levels.

Apply-

ing this analysis to attitude judgments, it would be expected that

inferences derived from

memory on

a

a

particular situation will be stored in

relatively concrete level.

As the context-specific

judgment is invoked to guide or explain behavior in new situations,
it may gradually develop beyond its narrow implications into

a

relatively abstract concept.
If abstract inferences are to be useful to the perceiver, they

should be linked to

a

wide range of more concrete judgments and

Links which spread excitation from the abstract concept

experiences.

to the concrete may be invoked when perceivers search for specific

support for

a

generalization.

Links allowing excitation to flow from

the concrete to the abstract can provide perceivers with

explanation of specific inferences and experiences.

a

general
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It is likely that memory-derived
attitudes will be represented

in memory in an abstract form.

most likely represents
or class of objects.

a

The attitude concept stored in memory

relationship between oneself and an object

Because these attitudes probably develop
in

relation to well-known domains, they will probably
have received

a

large amount of thought, and they may be linked
to an evaluatively-

consistent (Tesser, 1978) set of supporting experiences,
affective reactions and beliefs.

Attitudes as schemata

.

An attitude judgment can be considered an

evaluative inference about oneself, in that it represents
about one's orientation toward

a

particular object(s).

a

judgment

In this

sense, the attitude construct has much in common with self-theories.

Recent developments in the study of the self have identified selftheories with cognitive structures called schemata.

According to

Markus (1977), schemata "represent the way the self has been differ-

entiated and articulated in memory"

(p.

64).

They are cognitive

representations of personal characteristics, which can be

a

function

of a specific event or a function of the repeated categorization and

evaluation of one's behavior.
From the standpoint of the present analysis, it

is useful to

consider the attitudes which are derived from supporting cognitions
to be a kind of self-schema.

ducted from

a

Research on schemata is generally con-

cognitive perspective and it employs dependent

variables such as reaction time and recall.

It may therefore provide

some insight into the information processing functions of attitudes.
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Research on self-schemata generally
identifies those subjects
with

a

schema along

a

particular trait dimension (schematics)
and

those without (aschematics).

Then both groups engage in

utilizes their self-knowledge about this
attribute.

a

task which

The criteria

employed to differentiate schematics and aschematics
have generally

been limited to self-reports of extremity in

a

particular trait, self-

reports of the importance of the trait, or simply
ratings of whether
the trait is self-descriptive (Markus,

Kirker, 1979).

1977; Rogers, Rogers, &

The research results indicate that schematics are

faster at deciding whether schema-related information correctly

describes them and they make these decisions with more confidence
and less difficulty, they can provide more behavioral examples to

support their relevant self-perception, they predict

a

greater

likelihood of engaging in consistent behavior along the dimension,
and they are less likely to believe fictitious feedback about the

particular attribute (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Markus, 1977; Rogers,
Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977).

Other possible functions of schemata can

perhaps be inferred from research that has employed

a

similar ex-

perimental paradigm, but has not invoked the schema concept.
example,

Bern

For

and Allen (1974) found that subjects who initially

reported their behavior stable along

a

particular trait dimension,

compared with those who reported themselves unstable, subsequently
showed higher correlations between their relevant behaviors and

description of themselves in terms of the attribute.
a

a

Similarly, in

study on attitudes, Norman (1975) found that subjects with
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evaluatively consistent affective and
cognitive attitudinal components
were more likely to act in accord with their
stated opinion than subjects without consistent components.

Several theorists have conceptualized attitudes
in terms of

cognitive structure (Abelson, 1976; Tesser,
1978).

a

Abelson (1976)

has argued that "true" attitudes develop in relation
to domains that
one has personally experienced, and may take the
form of social

scripts.

Tesser (1978) provides evidence to suggest that thinking

about an attitude object for which one has

a

schema can polarize

evaluation of the object.
The cognitive theories previously discussed may provide more

detailed insight into the characteristics of schematic attitudes.

Extrapolating from

a

network model of memory, it may be that

attitudes which function as schemata are represented in memory as

abstract concepts, linked to

a

substructure of more concrete concepts,

which consist of related beliefs and previous experiences.

As sug-

gested by the research on schemata, such attitudes may affect the encoding, storage, and/or retrieval of relevant information.

distinction made previously between
on contemporaneous cues, and

a

a

The

context-derived attitude, based

memory-derived attitude, reflecting

detailed cognitive support, can perhaps be equated with the absence
and presence of

a

cognitive schema.

The finding that subjects who

are aschematic on a particular dimension are relatively susceptible
to fictitious feedback about their standing on the dimension (Markus,

1977) is consistent with this perspective.

Aschematics would be
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expected to utilize fictitious feedback
along wxth other contemporaneous cues to formulate their judgment.

The Present Research

The present research explores the postulated
differences in

cognitive support underlying memory- and
context-derived attitudes,
and examines how differences in informational
content underlying

attitude judgments are related to the impact of recent
behavioral
incidents on these judgments and to their susceptibility
to
persuasion.

According to the present analysis, perceivers expressing

memory-derived attitudes may be able to retrieve from memory previous
actions, beliefs, and affective reactions relevant to the attitude
object, whereas those indicating context-derived attitudes probably
do not have easy access to such detailed information.

If asked to

indicate their beliefs about the attitude object by generating

a

list of its characteristics (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), or if asked
to indicate their recall of previous experiences with the object by

listing their prior actions in regard to it, people who derive their

attitude from contextual cues may experience difficulty providing the
required information, whereas those with memory-derived attitudes may
have data of both types readily available.

Consequently, if only

a

short amount of time is provided for generating these lists,

individuals with memory-derived attitudes may be more successful at
this task.
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Susceptibility to persuasion.

Perceivers deriving attitude judgments

from memory may be little affected by persuasive
messages when

compared with those who do not have this basis of
support.

According

to a cognitive respose view of persuasion
(Petty & Cacioppo,

1979), message persuasiveness is

a

function of the nature of the

thoughts recipients generate in response to the communication.

Attitudes derived from supporting cognitions may be little affected
by counterattitudinal messages because information is available
for
the effective generation of counterarguments to the material

presented.

Individuals who commonly derive their attitude on an

issue from contemporaneous cues may be less resistant to persuasion

because they have little information available for counterarguing
the message.

Such message recipients may generate primarily favor-

able thoughts in reaction to the message.

Consistent with the

definition of context-derived attitudes, the judgments may be derived, at least in part, from the position suggested in the message.

Intrinsic motivation

.

The degree of cognitive support underlying an

attitude may also affect whether perceivers' judgments are dependent
on recent or salient behavioral incidents.

research, recent behaviors appear to have

attitudes.

In intrinsic motivation
a

sizeable impact on

However, attitudes with detailed cognitive support may be

less affected by recent behavior because the behavior is only one

piece of information on which the judgment is based.
this analysis is provided by

(Snyder & Ebbesen,

1972).

a

Some support for

study on counterattitudinal behavior

In this experiment,

subjects who were
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asked to organize their thoughts about the
attitude issue before they

engaged in

a

relevant behavior did not rely heavily on
the behavior

when subsequently indicating their attitude.

Other subjects who did

not organize their thoughts inferred attitudes
consistent with the
behavior.

Snyder and Ebbesen (1972) suggest that when

a

person has

recently formulated an opinion on an issue, he or she
simply supplies
the same opinion to the current assessment.

ments may certainly be employed as

a

Although previous judg-

basis for present opinions it is

also likely that thinking about their position encouraged subjects
to

retrieve and organize supportive beliefs and affective reactions.
Subjects may have relied partially on this information when expressing
their opinions.

CHAPTER

II

METHOD

First Experimental Session

Subjects.

A total of 166 University of Massachusetts
psychology

students participated for extra credit.

Seven of these were

eliminated because they did not complete the second-half of the
experiment.

Procedure

.

Subjects were recruited to participate in

experiment on attitudes and opinions.

a

two-session

It was explained that a

variety of instruments would be used to assess participants'
opinions on social issues.

Subjects participated in groups ranging

from ten to fifteen.

Subjects completed

a

questionnaire assessing their opinions

and other responses to seven issues, including the message topic,

preservation of the environment (see below).

They then responded

to a questionnaire which elicited their beliefs and their previous

behaviors in regard to five of the issues, including preservation
of the environment.

Finally, subjects indicated whether they had

participated in various organizations, and provided background
information (e.g., sex, class).

Subjects returned approximately

one week later to participate in one of the two experiments com-

prising the second experimental session.

28

29

Measuring instruments
Opinions.

.

Subjects indicated their initial opinions
on the topic

"preservation of the environment" on

a

15-point scale anchored by

"Very favorable" and "Very unfavorable."

Self-repor ts of previous reactions

.

On 15-point scales, sub-

jects indicated how frequently in the past few years
they had thought

about preservation of the environment, taken some action in
regard
to it, and had positive or negative feelings about it.

To assess

subjects' knowledge about preservation, they were asked to rate on
a

15-point scale how well-informed they were.

They were also asked

to rate how frequently in the past few years they had talked with

others about the topic, read articles and books on it, taken

relevant courses, and watched TV programs on it.

Ratings of these

specific information-gathering behaviors were averaged, and each
subject was assigned

a

mean score.

Subjects'

ratings of how well-

informed they were proved to be highly correlated with this mean
score (r = .71), and the two measures were summed into an index

representing subjects' knowledge about the topic.
Involvement

.

Subjects rated on two 15-point scales how person-

ally important and how involved they were in preservation of the environment.
(r =

Responses to these two items were highly correlated

.62), and were summed into an index representing degree of involve-

ment in the issue.

Belief retrieval

.

To determine the ease with which subjects could

retrieve attitudinally-relevant cognitions, they were asked to list
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on a questionnaire the characteristics
and facts they believed to
be true about preservation of the
environment.

The opinion topic

was listed at the top of the page, and
six boxes were provided

underneath.
box.

Subjects were told to write only one belief
in each

Several examples of beliefs about noncritical
topics were

provided.

Subjects were told that if they did not have six
beliefs

to list about a topic,

they should leave the boxes blank.

Subjects

were then given two minutes to list their beliefs
about the topic.
The number of discrete beliefs each subject listed about
preserva-

tion of the environment was judged by two independent raters
.91).

(r =

In addition, to explore the relations between opinion change

on preservation, the retrieval of topic-relevant beliefs, and the

retrieval of beliefs on other topics, the number of discrete beliefs subjects listed concerning psychological research was judged

by two raters (r = .94).

Behavior retrieval

Subjects'

.

behaviors was assessed in
task.

a

recall of attitudinally-relevant

manner similar to the belief retrieval

Subjects were asked to list specific instances of times when

they had engaged in actions related to the topic.

The number of

discrete behaviors each subject listed about preservation of the

environment and about psychological research was judged by two
independent raters (rs = .89 and .90, respectively).
Group membership

.

In order to provide information on the con-

current validity of the belief and behavior retrieval tasks, subjects were asked to indicate whether they belonged to environmental
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organizations which would provide them with
relevant experiences.
Second Experimenta l Session:

Subjects.

Susceptibility to Persuasion

A total of 65 subjects returned in groups
of about 12 to

complete this second session.

Procedure.

In this session, subjects again expected to
indicate their

opinions in

a

variety of formats.

The rationale, adapted from Jones

and Brehm (1967), for preceding the opinion questionnaire
by

a

persuasive message was that being exposed to someone else's opinion
and the arguments he or she uses to support this opinion gets
people
in the "right frame of mind to be critical and careful about
evaluating

their own opinions" and therefore makes it possible to measure their

opinions more accurately.
The experimenter next gave each subject

a

handout containing

further information about the persuasive message.

plained that each subject would read

a

The handout ex-

transcript of an interview

(actually hypothetical) that had been tape-recorded as part of an

opinion survey conducted on campus.

Participants in this survey,

including students, faculty, staff, and visitors, had (supposedly)

been asked to give an opinion on an issue and then support that

opinion with evidence.

The handout stated that over 100 different

interviews covering 10 topics were available and that, by random
selection, almost everyone would get
read.

a

different interview to

The handout also stated that participants may read an inter-

view in which the opinion expressed was quite different from their
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own since the interviews represented

wide sampling of opinions.

a

The experimenter then gave each subject
an interview transcript,

which contained the persuasive message.

The transcript began with

an interviewer asking an interviewee (source),
Jim H.

background information.

Jim

H.

was portrayed as

a

for some

,

graduate student

in biology who was very interested in the
issue of environmental

preservation.

In response to the interviewer's question, Jim

stated that, "I am not very strongly in favor of current
efforts to

preserve our environment
has negative effects.""

...

we have to recognize that preservation

Jim then went on to state four arguments

against preserving the environment:
impact on the economy,

(b)

(a)

preservation has

a

negative

the energy problem justifies lowering en-

vironmental standards to allow the burning of coal,

(c)

the preserved

land is needed for housing and for farm land, and (d) it is not

necessary to preserve the environment because it

is

possible to clean

up pollution.

After allowing about six minutes for reading the transcripts,
the experimenter distributed a questionnaire on which subjects

stated their opinions on

a

variety of social issues.

Two of these

issues were identical to the ones subjects rated earlier.

concerned preservation of the environment.

Next, the experimenter

explained that she was also interested in subjects'
the interviews.

Subjects completed

a

One topic

reactions to

questionnaire which elicited

their thoughts about the interview transcript, along with other

responses (see below).
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Measuring instruments
Opinions.

.

Subjects'

final opinions on preservation of
the en-

vironment were assessed on the opinion scale
described above.
Cognitive response measures.

Subjects were given two-and-a-half

minutes to list their thoughts about what the
communicator said in
the message.

The questionnaire, similar to that used by Petty
and

Cacioppo (1979), listed the instructions at the top of
the page, with
seven boxes underneath.

Two independent raters judged the number

of positive (r = .93), negative (r = .80), and neutral
(r = .53)

thoughts each subject produced.

Perceptions of the communicator

.

Subjects rated the communi-

cator on ten fifteen-point bipolar scales, with positive poles,

consistent, honest, sincere, non-opportunistic, non-manipulative,

non-compliant, open-minded, unbiased, objective, and likeable.

Message comprehension

.

Subjects were asked to summarize each

argument the communicator used to support his position, and two
independent judges determined the number correctly recalled
(r =

.88).

Subjects were also asked to write down the overall

position the communicator took in the interview.

Only two subjects

were not able to correctly recall the message position.

Suspicion

.

At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked

to describe in their own words the purpose of the study, and these

responses were coded for suspicion of persuasive intent.

Because

elimination of the seven suspicious subjects had little effect on
the results, they were retained in the analysis.
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Second Experimental Session:

Subjects.

Intrinsic Motivati on

A total of 94 subjects participated in this
second session.

One of these was eliminated because she declined to
deliver the

persuasive message.

Three more were eliminated because they were

suspicious of the cover story; they did not believe they would
deliver
the persuasive arguments.

Procedure

.

Subjects reported individually to

with attitude change.

second session concerned

a

The apparent purpose of this study was to deter-

mine the optimal number of arguments to use in

a

persuasive message.

The procedure was adapted from an experiment by Kiesler,

Nisbett, and Zanna (1969).

Subjects were asked to present some

arguments, previously prepared by the experimenter, to two people on
campus.

It was explained that a number of students were needed as

communicators so that the specific personality characteristics of
single communicator did not affect the results.

a

Subjects believed

that after presenting the arguments they would ask the message

recipients whether they were willing to sign
the message position.

a

petition in favor of

Subjects expected to rehearse before leaving

to conduct the task.

After describing the purpose and procedure of the study, the

experimenter (ostensibly) randomly assigned one of the topics subjects had rated in the first session.

In reality, all subjects

were asked to argue in favor of environmental preservation.

.
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At this point it was mentioned to half
of the subjects
(Reward condition) that they would receive
$5.00 for agreeing to

participate in this phase of the experiment.

The money was placed

in front of the subjects and remained visible
throughout the rest
of the session.

Half of the subjects were not offered

reward for their participation

(

No reward condition ).

a

monetary

Subjects were

then asked if they agreed to present the persuasive
message.
The experimenter then remarked that before the subjects

start to practice the communication, it would probably be
idea to get

a

good

measure of how they felt right now about the issue.

a

After indicating their opinions, subjects responded to

a

question-

naire assessing their explanations for agreeing to present the

message

After completing the questionnaire, subjects were asked if
they believed they would present the message.

briefed and excused.

They were then de-

Subjects in the reward condition received the

five dollars.

Measuring instruments
Opinions

.

.

Subjects indicated their opinions on preservation

of the environment on the opinion scale described above.

Attributions

.

On 15-point scales, subjects rated the importance

of several reasons for agreeing to persuade others to sign the

petition:

(a)

receiving experimental credit or payment,

vincing others about
(c)

a

(b)

con-

topic the subject really believed in, and

any other reason the subject cared to mention.

,

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS

First Experimental Session

The number of beliefs subjects indicated ranged
from

to

2

7

with an average of 3.75, and the number of behaviors ranged
from
with an average of 2.83.

0 to 6,

Median splits were performed on

both variables (medians = 3.70 and 2.73, for beliefs and behaviors,
respectively) and Number of Beliefs Retrieved from Memory (few vs.
many) X Number of Behaviors Retrieved (f ew vs. many) analyses of
2

variance were calculated,

along with appropriate contrasts.

Self-perception of past experiences and involvement

.

As expected,

subjects* perceptions of their past experiences and their involvement

concerning preservation of the environment corresponded to the number of beliefs and the number of behaviors they listed.
table

1,

As shown in

subjects who listed many behaviors, compared to those who

listed few, rated that they had thought more about preservation,

F(l,157) = 14.31,
12.26, £

<

.001,

15.67,

<

.001.

p_

p_

<

.001, had engaged in more action, F ( 1 157 ) =
,

and had experienced more feelings, F ( 1,157) =
In addition, subjects who listed many behaviors,

compared with those who listed few, indicated that they knew more
about the topic, F( 1 157 ) = 20.15,
,

p_

<

.001,

and perceived them-

selves to be more involved, F( 1,157) = 21.80, £

36

<

.001.
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no significant effects on these variables
were obtained for the

beliefs factor, differences between subjects
who listed few beliefs
and those who listed many were in the
predicted direction.

Group membership.

Participants who belonged to environmental groups

such as the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society
listed more behaviors
(19 listed many behaviors vs.

6

listed few) than participants who did

not belong to such organizations (70 listed many behaviors
vs. 62

listed few), x 2 = 4.52,

p_

<

.05.

Parallel results were obtained for

the belief factor, although they were not significant.

First Experiment:

Susceptibility to Persuasion

The hypotheses were explored by
2

(few vs. many behaviors) design.

a

2

(few vs. many beliefs) X

Because analyses including sub-

ject sex as an additional variable yielded no differences between
males' and females' persuasibility and no systematic differences

across other measures, this variable is not included in the following

analyses

Opinions

.

Analysis of covariance was conducted on the postopinions

with preopinions as the covariate.

That the covariance analysis was

appropriately conducted was suggested by

the test for homogeneity

(a)

of the covariate regression coefficients indicated that the co-

efficients did not differ across experimental conditions, and (b)
the covariate accounted for a significant amount of variance in the

analysis on postopinions, F(l,6l) = 6.97,

p_

<

.02,

f|

=

.34.

.
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Analysis of variance indicated that preoptions
were more pro-

environment in the many (M = 14.15) than few
behaviors conditions
(M = 13.22, p <

.05),

and that preopinions (M = 13.71) differed

significantly from postopinions (M = 11.85,

p_

<

.01)

Opinion means, which are the postopinion scores
adjusted on
the basis of the analysis of covariance, appear
in table

2.

Analysis of these data indicated that, as predicted,
subjects who
listed many behaviors changed their opinions less in
response to
the persuasive message than those who listed few behaviors,

F(l,6l) = 7.91, £

<

.01,

n =

-47.

Also, those who listed a large

number of beliefs changed their opinions less than those who
indicated few beliefs, F(l,6l) = 4.43, £

<

.05,

q =

.34.

The above analysis does not reveal whether subjects' attitude

change was

a

function of the retrieval of topic-specific information

(i.e., beliefs and behaviors concerning preservation of the environ-

ment) or whether it represented

a

general cognitive style which

provided easy or difficult access to relevant information about the
self.

To explore these possibilities, subjects'

retrieval of beliefs

and behaviors on a second topic, psychological research, was employed
as a predictor of opinion change on preservation of the environment.

The analysis suggested that the opinion change may have been

tion of topic-specific retrieval:

belief measure.

a

No effects were obtained on the

Although subjects who indicated few behaviors

concerning psychological research became less proenvironment
(M = 11.39)

func-

than those who indicated many (M = 12.66, £

<

.02),

40

TABLE

MEAN POSTOPINIONS:

Number of
beliefs retrieved
from memory

2

PERSUASION EXPERIMENT

Number of behaviors retrieved from memorv
Few behaviors

Many behaviors

Few beliefs

10.32

12.08

Many beliefs

11.67

12.74

Note:
Means are adjusted postopinion scores on a 15-point scale
on which higher numbers indicate greater favorability toward
preservation of the environment.

.
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this effect could be due to the correlation
between the number of

behaviors listed about the environment and about
psychological

research (r = .45,

.001).

<

p_

Indeed, when

stepwise regression

a

analysis was conducted, which predicted opinion
change from behavio,»rs

concerning psychological research after the variance
due to behaviors
concerning preservation was removed, the research measure
was no
longer signficant

>

(p_

.20).

Self-perceptions as predictors of opinion change

.

A hierarchical

regression analysis was performed to determine whether subjects'
self-

perceptions significantly contributed to the prediction of opinion
change, after the variance due to the belief and behavior retrieval

factors was removed.

The self-perception variables proved to be

marginal or significant predictors when each was entered into

a

separate regression equation, after the belief and behavior factors:

thought (B = .19,
(B =

.36,

p_

<

<

p_

.001),

edge (B = .21, £

<

.10), behavior (B = .29,

involvement (B = .50,

p_

<

p_

<

.01),

feelings

.001), and knowl-

.07)

A hierarchical regression analysis was also computed by first

entering each self-perception measure into

a

separate equation and

then entering the belief and behavior retrieval variables.

The

analyses revealed that the belief and behavior factors remained

significant predictors of opinion change

(p_s

<

.05), except that

when knowledge was included in the equation, the behavior factor
was only marginally significant

(p_

<

.08).

.
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Informatio nal responses to the communicator's
message

Cognitive responses.

Subjects'

message are presented in table

.

thoughts about the communicator's

Subjects who indicated many be-

3.

haviors, compared with those who listed few,
generated

ber of favorable thoughts, F(l,6l) = 5.86,
£

<

.05,

greater number of counterarguments, F(l,6l) =
8.10,
H

= .39.

a

smaller num-

q =

-33,

<

.01,

p_

and

a

No effects were obtained on the analysis of neutral

thoughts

Evidence for these responses as mediators of opinion change
was provided by the correlations between favorable thoughts and

adjusted postopinions (r =

-

.

23

,

p_

<

.

08)

,

and between counter-

arguments and adjusted postopinions (r = .41,

p_

<

.01).

The

mediational role of these responses was further explored through
hierarchical regression.

When counterarguments were entered into

the analysis before the retrieval factors, the beliefs factor be-

came only

a

marginally significant predictor of opinion change,

F(l,59) = 3.04, £
a

<

.10,

and the behaviors factor became

less effective predictor, F(l,59) = 4.56,

thoughts measure was not

'

p_

<

.05.

The favorable

significant predictor of opinion change

a

in the regression analysis.

Message comprehension

.

Analysis of the number of message argu-

ments subjects recalled yielded no effects, and the correlation

between the number recalled and the adjusted postopinions was not
significant.
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Perception of the communicator

A factor analysis (varxmax rotation)

.

of the source ratings yielded three
rotated factors.

The factors,

which accounted for 28.9%, 18.2%, and 10.8%
of the variance, were
labeled "Unbiased" (open-minded, unbiased),
"Sincere" (honest,
sincere, likeable), and "Objective" (objective,
unbiased), respectively.

Factor scores were computed for each subject and
then

treated by analysis of variance.

The source was judged less

biased by subjects who listed few beliefs (M =
.40), compared

with those who listed many (M = -.27), F(l,6l) = 8.03,
£

<

.01.

In addition, the source was perceived as more sincere by
subjects

who listed few behaviors (M = .33), compared with those who listed

many (M = -.29), F(l,6l) = 7.22, £

<

.01.

No effects were obtained

in the analysis on the objective factor.

The consistent, nonopportunistic

,

nonmanipulative

,

and non-

compliant scales, which failed to load highly on any of these
factors, were analyzed separately.

Only the analysis of the non-

manipulative variable yielded significant effects.

Subjects who

listed few beliefs perceived the source to be more nonmanipulative
(M = 8.56)

than those who listed many beliefs (M = 7.27),

F(l,6l) = 4.89, £

<

.05.

Subjects tended to change their opinions to the extent that
they perceived the source as unbiased and nonmanipulative (rs =
-.24 and -.26, respectively, ps

<

.06).

However, because these

perceptions were not significant predictors of opinion change when
entered into

a

hierarchical regression analysis before the retrieval

45

factors, perceptions did not mediate
opinion change.

Second Experiment:

Intrinsic Motivation

The hypotheses were explored by
2

(few vs. many behaviors) X

appropriate contrasts.

2

a

2

(few vs. many beliefs) X

(reward vs. no reward) design and

Because analyses including subject sex as

an additional variable yielded no differences
between males' and

females' persuasibility and no systematic differences
across other

measures, this variable is not included in the following
analyses.

Opinions

Similar to Experiment

.

1,

analysis of covariance was con-

ducted on the postopinions, with preopinions as the covariate.

Again,

the test for homogeneity of the covariate regression coefficients

indicated that the coefficients did not differ across experimental
conditions, and the covariate accounted for a significant amount of

variance in the prediction of opinion change, F(l 79) = 43.08,
,

p_

<

.001,

r|

= .53.

Analysis of variance indicated that preopinions

did not vary across experimental conditions, and that preopinions
(M = 14.03)

p_

<

differed significantly from postopinions (M = 12.81,

.05).

Opinion means, which are the postopinion scores adjusted on the
basis of the analysis of covariance, appear in table

4.

The results

replicated the findings typically obtained in self-perception
research:

Subjects who received

a

reward changed their opinions to

be less favorable toward preservation of the environment than sub-

jects in the no reward conditions, F( 1 79 ) = 7.66,
,

p_

<

.01,

q =

.19.
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TABLE 4

MEAN POSTOPINIONS:

INTRINSIC MOTIVATION EXPERIMENT

Few behaviors
retrieved from memory
Number of
beliefs retrieved
from memory

Many behaviors
ret rieved from memo

Reward

No reward

Reward

No rewar

Few
beliefs

11..47

13.,15

13..21

13..52

Many
beliefs

11 .43

12.,66

13,.26

13..14

Not
Means are adjusted postopinion scores on a 15-point scale
on which higher numbers indicate greater favorability toward
preservation of the environment.
:
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Further, the results provided support for
the present hypotheses.

Subjects who indicated few behaviors showed
more change than those
who indicated many behaviors, F(l,79) =
17.22,
Also,

a

p_

<

.001,

q =

.41.

Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction, F(l
79) = 6.87,
,

p_

<

.02,

n =

indicated that the difference between the reward

-21,

and the no reward conditions was significant for
subjects who listed
few behaviors, F(l,79) = 17.59,

listed many (F

<

1).

p_

<

.001, but not for those who

Post hoc comparisons among means, by the

Sheffe method, revealed that the opinion means of rewarded subjects
who indicated few behaviors and few beliefs or many beliefs
differed

significantly

<

(p_

.05)

from all other opinion means.

Similar to Experiment
change was indeed

1,

to determine whether subjects'

attitude

function of the retrieval of topic-specific

a

information, subjects' retrieval of beliefs and behaviors on

psychological research was employed as
on preservation of the environment.

a

predictor of opinion change

Neither beliefs nor behaviors

concerning psychological research proved to be predictors of

opinion change (Fs

<

1).

Self-perceptions as predictors of opinion change

Experiment

1,

a

.

As in

hierarchical regression analysis was performed to

determine whether subjects' self -perceptions contributed to the

prediction of opinion change, after the variance due to the belief
and behavior retrieval factors, the reward manipulation, and the

Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction was removed.
the self-perceptions was a significant predictor:

Each of

thoughts

.
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(B -

.26,

•28,

£

(B =

.

<

.01),

<

25

E

,

p_

<

.01), behavior

(B =

.30,

involvement (B = .36,

p_

g

<

<

.001), and knowledge

.001),

feelings (B =

.01)

A step-wise regression analysis was also
computed by first

entering each of the self-perception measures into
separate equations
along with the reward manipulation, and then adding
the belief and

behavior retrieval variables and the Reward X Behaviors
interaction
in the second step.

The analyses revealed that in all equations the

behavior factor and the Reward X Behaviors interaction were
significant

(p_

<

.05) or marginally significant

(p_

<

.10) predictors

of opinion change.

Attributions

.

As shown in table 5, subjects who were rewarded

attributed the decision to deliver the persuasive arguments more to
the reward than subjects who did not receive the reward, F(l ,79) =

3.08,

p_

<

.09,

0 =

-20.

Subjects who listed many beliefs attributed the decision

marginally more to belief in preservation than subjects who listed
few beliefs, F(l,79) = 3.62, £

<

.06,

q =

.23

(see table 5).

In

addition, a Reward X Number of Behaviors interaction, F ( 1,79) =
8.20, £

<

.01,

r|

= .29,

revealed that in the few behaviors groups,

subjects who were not rewarded attributed the decision more to their

belief in the issue than those who received
3.81, £
a

<

a

reward, F ( 1 79 ) =

.05, but in the many behaviors groups,

,

rewarded subjects made

stronger attribution to their belief than not rewarded subjects,

F(l,79) = 3.62, £

<

.06.
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Evidence that attribution to belief mediated
opinion change was

provided by

a

hierarchical regression analysis.

When attribution to

belief was entered into the analysis before the
behavior retrieval
factor, the reward manipulation, and the Reward
X Behaviors inter-

action, the behaviors factor was no longer
of opinion change, F(

1

,

82) = 2 63
.

,

p_

<

.

12

a

,

significant predictor
and the reward manipu-

lation and the interaction were only marginally significant,
F(l,82) = 3.51, and F(l,82) = 3.62, respectively,

Attribution to reward was not

a

p_s

<

.07.

significant predictor of opinion

change in the regression analysis.

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

According to the proposed distinction between
memory- and
context-derived attitudes, individuals who can retrieve

a ttitudina Ir-

relevant information from memory will employ this
information, in

preference to contextual cues, to assess how favorable they
are
toward the attitude object.

In contrast,

individuals who do not

have easy access to such information in memory will rely relatively

more on contextual cues and recent behavior to assess their attitude.

New information that counters initial opinions was expected to have
a

greater impact on context- than memory-derived attitudes because

context-derived attitudes are drawn more from the data that

is

currently available and less from prior experiences and beliefs.
The present research appears to have been an appropriate site
for exploring differences between memory- and context-derived

attitudes.

The distinction between these two attitudes was opera-

tionalized in terms of whether few or many beliefs and few or many
behaviors relevant to preservation of the environment were indicated
in the listing tasks.

For the retrieval of beliefs and behaviors

to reflect this distinction,

they should correspond to other measures

which reflect access to attitudinally-relevant cognitions and prior
experiences.

Indeed, subjects who listed many behaviors, compared

with those who listed few, perceived themselves to have experienced

51
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raore

thought, action, and feelings about
preservation and to be more

knowledgeable and involved.

Results for the belief measure
were

similar, though nonsignificant.

Further, subjects who belonged to

environmental groups such as the Sierra Club
or the Audubon Society
indicated more behaviors than those not members
of such groups.
Impact of Belief and Behavior Retrieval on
Opinio ns

Persuasion experiment.

Subjects, who were generally in favor of

preservation of the environment, were presented with
message that argued against preservation.

a

persuasive

Those who retrieved from

memory many beliefs relevant to preservation, compared with
few
beliefs, and many behaviors, compared with few behaviors, showed
less

opinion change.

Consistent with
(Petty & Cacciopo,

a

cognitive response analysis of persuasion

1979), the cognitive responses appeared to be

mediators of the effects of belief and behavior retrieval on opinion
change.

In the experiment,

the cognitive responses produced were

a

function of the extent to which subjects could retrieve relevant
experiences from memory.

Subjects who retrieved many behaviors

produced thoughts favorable to the message and more counterarguments
than those who retrieved few behaviors.

The cognitive responses were

then found to be appropriately related to opinion change.

Both

favorable thoughts and counterarguments were significantly correlated

with change.

Further evidence that these responses mediated ac-

ceptance of the persuasive message was suggested by

a

hierarchical

53

regression analysis predicting opinion
change.

When the counter-

arguments variable was entered first
into the equation, the factor

representing belief retrieval was no longer

a

significant predictor,

and the factor representing behavior
retrieval became

tive predictor.

a

less effec-

It thus appears that attitudes which
were derived

from beliefs and behaviors retrieved from
memory were little affected

by the persuasive message because information
was available for the

effective production of counterarguments to the
material presented.
Perceptions of the communicator yielded effects similar
to the
cognitive response measures, although perceptions were
not clearly

mediators of opinion change.

The source was perceived as more

biased and manipulative by subjects who retrieved many, than few,
beliefs, and was 'perceived as less sincere by subjects who retrieved
many, than few, behaviors.

Although perceptions of bias and

manipulation were correlated with opinion change, regression analyses
suggested that they did not mediate the effects of belief and behavior
retrieval on persuasion.

Intrinsic motivation experiment

.

Subjects were either rewarded or

not rewarded for deciding to deliver arguments in favor of preserva-

tion of the environment to students on campus.

That the reward was

successfully manipulated was suggested by the fact that rewarded subjects attributed their decision marginally more to the reward than
not rewarded subjects.
The opinion change of subjects who retrieved few behaviors con-

formed to the results typically obtained in self-perception research:
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Subjects who were rewarded for decxdxng
to argue in favor of
preservation inferred a less positive attitude
than subjects who were not

rewarded for their decision.

In contrast, subjects who
retrieved .any

behaviors showed little opinion change in
either reward or no reward
conditions.

These results suggest that when little
cognitive support

underlies an attitude, perceivers' judgments
are highly affected by
recent behavioral incidents.

However, attitudes with detailed

cognitive support are less affected by recent
behavior, most likely
because the behavior is only one piece of information
on which the

judgment is based.
Subjects'

explanations for their decision to present the

arguments supported the attribution interpretation of opinion
change.

It should be recalled that intrinsic attributions reflect

an explanation in terms of one's belief in an issue, whereas ex-

trinsic attributions reflect explanations in terms of cues independent of the attitude object, such as the reward in the present ex-

periment.

That in the few behaviors groups, rewarded subjects,

compared with those not rewarded, made

a

less intrinsic attribution

was indicated by the fact that they attributed their decision rela-

tively less to belief in preservation.

This finding parallels the

difference obtained on opinion change between rewarded and not rewarded subjects.

In contrast, in the many behaviors groups, differ-

ences between rewarded and not rewarded subjects were unexpectedly
in the opposite direction:

Those who received

a

reward, compared

with those who did not, attributed the decision more to their
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belief.

This result is not reflected in
the opinxon change findings.

The extent to which subjects explained
their decision in terms
of belief in preservation appeared to
mediate opinion change.

A

hierarchical regression analysis indicated that
when attribution to
belief was entered first into an equation
predicting opinion change,
the behavior retrieval factor was no longer

significant predictor,

a

and the reward manipulation and the Reward X
Behaviors interaction

became only marginally significant predictors.

Thus, the reward

and the retrieval of prior experiences affected opinion
change

primarily through the mediation of subjects' explanations.

Sub-

jects who had access to relevant experiences incorporated this

information into their explanations and inferred
favorable opinion.

a

relatively

In contrast, the mediation of opinion change

for subjects without access to relevant experiences conformed to

the hypothesized process by which attitudes are inferred from be-

haviors.

After identifying the plausible cause(s) for their

decision, subjects who were not rewarded, compared with those who
were, made attributions more to belief in preservation and subse-

quently inferred

a

more favorable attitude.

These mediational findings support the self-perception analysis
that when internal cues, such as prior experiences relevant to the

attitude object, are not accessible, attitudes are inferred from

behavior and the context in which it occurs
analysis extends this theory by providing an

(Bern,

a

1972).

The present

priori means of deter-

mining when attitudes will reflect primarily experiences retrieved
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from memory or primarily explanations of recent
or salient behavior.
The attribution findings are also informative
concerning

subjects'

access to their causal analysis.

The fact that subjects

were able to report on the attributional factor
that mediated

opinion change suggests that they may have had access to
higher
order processing.

However, it has been argued that people report

on such processing not because they have access to it, but
because
the reports reflect a priori theories of causality (Nisbett
& Wilson,

1977).

Reports of processing are thought to be accurate only when

intuitive theories of causality correspond to actual analyses.
Thus it is unclear whether subjects in the present research truly

had access to their processing.

Other Issues

The analyses consistently yielded significant differences due
to the number of behaviors listed but only in a few instances did

the beliefs factor yield significant effects.

It is possible that

the extent to which relevant behaviors can be retrieved is, in

general,

a

more important contributor to opinions than the retrieval

of relevant beliefs.

Indeed, it has been argued that attitudes

based primarily on information obtained through indirect experiences

with the attitude object (i.e., information acquired second hand)
are relatively unclear and not confidently held (Fazio & Zanna, in

press).

Attitudes which are based on the information obtained

through prior action, however, are thought to be well-defined and
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held confidently.

Another possible reason why the beliefs
measure is

a

effective predictor of opinions than the
behaviors measure
it may be a less perfect indicator of
subjects'

subjects listed on the average

a

retrieval.

le;ss
is bee ause

That

greater number of beliefs than be-

haviors could suggest that they were not only
indicating beliefs
stored in memory but were also generating new
beliefs during the

listing task.

The act of retrieving beliefs may have spontaneously

resulted in newly perceived relations between preservation
and other
constructs stored in memory.

The retrieval of behaviors, however,

may be less likely to generate newly perceived instances because
recall of specific examples of previous experiences is required.
The beliefs measure may therefore have contained

a

greater degree

of error, which would make it a less effective predictor of opinion

change in the analysis.

Other means of operationalizing the belief

and behavior constructs, however, may find that access to both is

equally important in determining opinions.

Self-perceptions and the retrieval factors

.

Analysis of the self-

perception measures suggested that subjects were informed about the
degree of organization of their beliefs and prior experiences.

Self-

perceptions of retrievable information were systematically related
to the belief and behavior retrieval factors, which represented

relatively direct measures of access.

For example, subjects who

retrieved many, rather than few, behaviors considered themselves
to have experienced more thought and to be more knowledgeable.
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Although it has been argued that
people often do not have access
to
cognitive processing (Nisbett & Wilson,

1977), subjects in the present

study appeared to be aware of this
processing to the extent that
they
reported accurately on the stored
information.

Self-perceptions were not based entirely on
access to

attitudinally-relevant information.

A hierarchical regression analysis

revealed that even though the retrieval
factors and the self-

perception measures accounted for some of the
same variance in predicting opinion change, they were also independent
contributors.
Thus, self-perceptions were derived from information
(such as

temporary mood states) which was related to opinion change
independent of the retrieval of beliefs and prior experiences.

Comparisons between the effectiveness of self-perceptions and
retrieval factors as predictors of opinion change suggest that, in
general, the retrieval factors yield the results which are most

consistent with the hypotheses.

Although self-perceptions,

especially behaviors, feelings, and involvement, often yielded
effects greater in magnitude than the retrieval factors, the
results of analyses that incorporated self-perceptions instead of

these factors did not strictly conform to the hypotheses.

In the

intrinsic motivation experiment, separate regression equations

predicting opinion change from each self-perception measure,

a

term

representing the interaction between the self-perception and reward,
and the reward manipulation revealed that none of the Reward X Self-

Perceptions were significant (Fs

<

1).

Since the interaction be-

tween reward and retrieval of behaviors was critical to the

59

interpretation of the opinion change
results, self-perception
measures cannot effectively be substituted
for this retrieval
factor.

Attitudes as Schemata

Self-schemata have commonly been considered

a

representation

of the organization of information about
the self on

a

particular

personality or attitude dimension, and not the
organization of information about the self in general (Markus,
1977; Rogers, Kuiper,
& Kirker,

1977).

This analysis implies that in the present research,

opinion change on preservation of the environment should
not necessarily be related to the cognitive structure underlying
subjects'
opinions on other issues.

Indeed, it was found that opinion change

was not effectively predicted from the retrieval of beliefs and be-

haviors concerning psychological research.

Thus, consistent with

theories of cognitive schemata, it appears that opinion change was

a

function of topic-specific retrieval and not general accessibility to

information in memory.
Attitude schemata have been conceptualized in terms of attitude

extremity (Judd & Kulik, 1980), and consistency between affective and
cognitive components of attitudes (Chaiken & Baldwin, Note

present findings suggest that attitude extremity

is not

1).

The

necessarily

related to the organization of information concerning an attitude
issue.

Although in the persuasion experiment, subjects who indicated

many behaviors had more polarized attitudes than those who indicated
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few, analysis of covariance adjusted
for extremity of initial
opinions,

and the results remained supportive
of the hypothesized effects of

retrieval on opinion change.

Affective-cognitive consistency theory and the
present analysis
of access to attitudinally-relevant
information have identified

similar relations between consistency or retrieval
and opinion
change.

Chaiken and Baldwin (Note

found that attitudes composed

1)

of low consistency components, compared with high,
were more likely
to reflect salient behaviors.

This finding is comparable to the

fact that in the intrinsic motivation experiment, the
attitudes of

subjects who could retrieve few behaviors, compared with many,
were

derived more from recent behavior and the context in which it
occurred.

It is not surprising that findings from these two studies

are similar.

In terms of the present framework, affective-cognitive

consistency may be one by-product of
structure.

a

well-organized cognitive

Consistency, then, may be related to retrieval because

these variables may both tap the organization of attitudinally-

relevant information.

However, measures of access to prior exper-

iences and cognitions should in general be

a

better predictor of

opinions because they more directly measure this organization.

Measuring the number of beliefs and behaviors subjects indicate
in a limited period of time is only one means of identifying the

cognitive structure underlying attitude judgments.

Other open

response measures can be devised to assess to what extent

attitudinally-relevant information is organized in memory, and thus
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to what extent it is retrievable.

A hierarchical perspective of

memory would suggest that the order in which
relevant beliefs and
experiences are indicated can reveal the degree
of organization.

For example,

a

hierarchical structure would be indicated if
the

abstract cognitions subjects list are followed by
related, more
concrete instances.

Subjects who list only unrelated, abstract

cognitions are less likely to have such

a

structure.

This kind of

assessment of the content of subjects' beliefs and experiences
would
be expected to have effects on opinion change similar
to both the

retrieval measures employed in the present research and the measures
of cognitive schemata employed by other researchers.

Related Conceptions of Attitudes

It should be noted that the idea of attitude schemata is not the

only conception of attitudes which is related to the present dis-

tinction between memory- and context-derived judgments.

For example,

Rokeach (1970) proposed that attitudes "are arranged along
peripheral dimension wherein the more central

.

.

.

a

central-

are more salient

or important, more resistant to change, and if changed exert relatively greater effects on other parts" (p.

117).

However, it is unclear

how attitude centrality would be operationalized because little

systematic research has been conducted on this proposition.

In ad-

dition, Rokeach did not focus on the information that might underlie

central vs. noncentral attitudes.

The concept of centrality was

conceived within the tradition of cognitive consistency theories,
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and thus does not explore the storage
and retrieval of attitudinally-

relevant information, which is the focus
of the present cognitive
approach.

Another conceptualization of attitudes which
has some similarity
to the present analysis is McGuire's

(1968) work on the inoculation

approach to resistance to persuasion.

McGuire recognized that

attitudes such as those represented by cultural
truisms (e.g., it's
good to brush your teeth twice

a

day) have little underlying cog-

nitive support and thus are very susceptible to persuasive
attempts.
However, the focus of the inoculation work was on conferring
re-

sistance to persuasion, and did not analyze the information
underlying attitude judgments.

Conclusion

The findings of the two studies highlight the importance of

distinguishing between two types of attitudes:

(a)

attitudes

derived from prior experiences and beliefs organized in memory,
and (b) those derived from contextual cues and behavior.

In both

the persuasion and intrinsic motivation experiments, subjects'

opinion change was

a

function of the degree to which they had

access to relevant information.

This approach, which focuses on

access to topic-specific information, is concerned with the

immediate antecedents of change on particular issues.

It is in

contrast to research which has generally been unsuccessful in

predicting opinion change from global personality traits, such as
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self-esteem (Eagly, in press).
The present analysis of the immediate
antecedents of opinion

change does not specify how other determinates,
such as one's

prior experiences, may affect the organization
in memory of
construct, and ultimately opinions.

a

self-

The fact that membership in

environmental groups was related to behavior retrieval
indicates
that the retrieval factors reflect some differences
in prior behavior.

Yet membership proved to have

a

direct impact on opinion

change only in the intrinsic motivation experiment, F(l,83) =
7.00,
p_

<

.02.

Further research is needed to determine to what extent

differences in experiences and beliefs underlie differences in
access to attitudinally-relevant information in memory, and thus

what impact these prior experiences have on opinion change.
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FOOTNOTES
l

Although an attitude inference can
result from attribution to
oneself or to the attitude object,
perceivers' confidence in their

attitude judgments may depend on the
causal factor that
(Kelley,

1967).

is

identified

When assessing the validity of their
perceptions,

people may infer that attitudes derived from
self attributions reflect
something idiosyncratic about themselves whereas
attitudes derived
from entity attributions may be perceived as
consensual reactions

which reflect

a

characteristic of the attitude object.

Kelley (1967)

suggests that entity attributions enable perceivers to
feel relatively

confident in their judgments.
2

The number of behaviors and the number of beliefs subjects

listed were correlated (r = .30,

p_

<

.05).

Independent variables

that are correlated have been termed collinear.

The degree of re-

lationship between these variables in the present study

is

small,

thus collinearity can be expected to result in somewhat conservative,

though not particularly biased, tests of significance.
3

Although the persuasion study was initially constructed so that
subjects received persuasive messages on one of two issues, preservation of the environment or energy conservation, preliminary data

analyses indicated that only the environmental message produced any

measurable opinion change.

It may be that subjects did not change

their opinions on energy conservation because most of them were able
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73

to retrieve a large amount of
energy-related information from memory,

Indeed, the fact that subjects listed on
the average

a

greater

number of beliefs and behaviors relevant to
energy (Ms =4.22 and
3.87, respectively) than to environment could be due
to the recent

national publicity campaign emphasizing conservation.

The energy

topic was therefore dropped from the analysis of
the persuasion

study and was not included in the intrinsic motivation
study.

